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Szekfű (1883–1955), was a renowned historian 
and an influential ideologue as well. 2. To give 
a reconstructive analysis of the theory of Ferenc 
Erdei, the Hungarian sociologist who, reject-
ing the pattern-imitating modernization based 
on Western European models, elaborated the 
idea of alternative urbanization leading to an 
     DOI  https://doi.org/10.3846/cpc.2017.282
From the guilty city to the ideas oF alternative  
urbanization and alternative modernity:  
anti-urbanism as a border-zone oF city-PhilosoPhy 
and cultural criticism in the interwar  
hungarian Political thought
gábor KovÁcs
Institute of Philosophy, Research Centre for the Humanities, Hungarian Academy of Sciences,  
1097 Budapest, Tóth Kálmán u. 4, 1453, p.o.b. 33, Budapest, Hungary 
E-mails: kovacs.gabor@btk.mta.hu, gbrkvcs3@gmail.com
Received 15 June 2017; accepted 20 August 2017
The phenomenon of anti-urbanism has accompanied the process of modernisation since the emergence of 
modernity. The city, the modern metropolis played a vital role in this transition from premodern world to 
modern era. The metamorphosis of archaic structures, including the fields of economy, society and think-
ing, are inevitably associated with tensions engendering aversion against the city. Anti-urbanism appeared 
sporadically everywhere, as a continuous tradition, it emerged at two remote corners of the world: in United 
States and Germany. Hungarian anti-urbanism of the interwar period had been motivated by the shock of 
the disintegration of the “Historical Greater Hungary”. The motif of guilty city emerged in the atmosphere of 
scapegoating: Budapest appeared as incompatible with Hungarian national character. These ruminations about 
the role of city were embedded in a special context mixing city-philosophy, cultural criticism, German-origin 
crisis philosophy, political philosophy and national characterology. It was a peculiar mixture in the Central 
European region: Hungarian interwar thought, from this respect, follows the regional patterns.      
Keywords: alternative modernity, anti-urbanism, cultural criticism, metropolis, national character. 
introduction
My intent, in this paper, is twofold:  1. to con-
textualize the anti-urban ideas of two important 
Hungarian thinkers of the interwar period. The 
first of them, Dezső Szabó (1879–1945) was a 
writer and ideologue, his contemporary, Gyula 
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alternative modernity (Rohkrämer 1999). What 
follows here, is a comparative reconstruction 
based on three case studies. Our hypothesis 
is that the cultural package of anti-urbanism 
which in the German interwar cultural context 
was a part and parcel of crisis-philosophy and 
city-philosophy – the best example of it is the 
Spenglerian philosophy – in the Hungarian 
culture constituted a special border-zone 
mixing literal, philosophical and sociological 
approaches.      
international context
The “Grand War”, as it usually mentioned, 
proved a watershed between two historical 
epochs having parted the pre-war era of liberal 
capitalism, the years of happy peace time in 
nostalgic Hungarian popular historical recol-
lection, from the stormy, hectic years of the 
interwar period. The war, in this case, was a 
magnifier: it had magnified and intensified the 
symptoms of the fin de siècle crisis which was a 
complex phenomenon: it was on the one hand, 
a modernity-crisis, and, at the same time, it was 
a crisis of modernization which is, so to say, is an 
inevitable concomitant of modernization pro-
cess everywhere when pre-modern economic, 
social and mental structures are dissolving and 
are compelled to give place for new ones (to 
the coincidence of modernity-crisis and crisis 
of modernization in Germany see Nipperdey 
(1986)).
Modernity-crisis means the crisis of a given 
type of modernity being dominant up to the 
moment of challenging its validity. The 19th 
century type of modernity, as a first step of 
globalization, with the practice and ideology 
of liberal capitalism seemed to live up its in-
ner reserves. The idea of linear modernization 
including all spheres of life from technology 
and economy to society and culture seemed 
to be inappropriate for the interpretation of 
the changes of reality. The case of Germany, 
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (AHM) or 
the Russian Empire proved the possibility of 
sectional or departmentalized modernization; 
it meant some kind of hybridized reality with 
the compartments or segments of modern 
and premodern structures. The optimistic idea 
of overall progress lost its validity1 – cultural 
criticism was a reaction to this situation. Anti-
urbanism was a customary item in the package 
of the cultural criticism putting its roots to 
the fin de siècle modernism. What, before the 
Grand War, had been a plaything of modern-
ist counter-culture became a dominant colour 
of political and cultural mainstream (to the 
history of counter culture see Green (1986)). 
Applying of antithetical notions – culture–civi-
lization, organic–mechanic, community–society, 
city–countryside, authentic–inauthentic – to 
the description of reality was a conspicuous 
characteristic of the intellectual strategy of the 
thinkers of German conservative revolution 
whose ideas strongly influenced the interwar 
Hungarian cultural criticism from Szekfű to 
László Németh or Lajos Prohászka (Mohler, 
Weissmann 1989; Woods 1996). 
The phenomenon of anti-urbanism has 
accompanied the process of modernisation 
since the emergence of modernity. The modern 
metropolis played a vital role in the transition 
from premodern world to modern era. The 
metamorphosis of archaic structures, includ-
ing the fields of economy, society and thinking, 
inevitably had been associated with tensions 
engendering a version against the city. 
1 This disillusionment has very expressively been 
for mu lated by Walter Benjamin: “A Klee painting 
named ‘Angelus Novus’ shows an angel looking as 
though he is about to move away from something 
he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are staring, his 
mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how 
one pictures the angel of history. His face is tur-
ned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of 
events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps 
piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front 
of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the 
dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But 
a storm is blowing from paradise; it has got caught 
in his wings with such violence that the angel can 
no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels 
him into the future to which his back is turned, whi-
le the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This 
storm is what we call progress” (1969: 257–258).   
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hungarian context
Hungary after the World War I (WWI) had to 
confront the shocking experience of Treaty of 
Trianon (TT) imposed upon the country by 
the victor allied powers. As a consequence of 
it the country had lost two thirds of its terri-
tory and the half of its population (on the TT 
and its consequences see Bibó 2015: 217–221). 
A new constellation, as a socio-psychological 
consequence of war defeat, emerged: borrow-
ing the term coined by Wolfgang Schivelbusch, 
the German cultural historian it was the cul-
ture of defeat. This phenomenon, according 
to Schivelbusch, is typical in modern mass-
societies enforced to face the consequences 
of a lost war; it is a pathological fixation of 
collective consciousness to the recollection of 
defeat. War defeat, of course is one of the most 
frequently experienced situation of societies 
in human history but in modern times it is 
of great importance because it dominates not 
only the elites but permeates the whole society 
and it results in a paralyzed state of collective 
mentality. The culture of defeat arising in a 
traumatized society manifests itself in differ-
ent symptoms ranging from scapegoating and 
self-chastisement to escape in a dream world 
and the presentation of the real defeat as a 
moral victory. The culture of defeat is a breed-
ing soil for different myths fulfilling the func-
tion of protecting shield between the injured 
collective psychē and the unbearable reality. 
Schivelbusch compares the post-war situations 
of the South America, France and Germany af-
ter the American Civil War of 1861–1865, after 
the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871 and 
after the WWI. The collective psychē in these 
cases reacted similarly: it produced a protective 
mechanism based on myths serving as escape 
route from the unbearable reality:
“What neurosis is to individual, the creation 
of myths is to the collective. […] Such myths 
(or, in the Freudian terms, fantasies) arising 
from frustrated desires for revenge, are the 
psychological mechanisms for coming to terms 
with defeat. Moreover, they are not merely 
neurotic fictions of the imaginations but also 
healthful protective shields or buffer zones – 
emotional fortresses – against a reality unbear-
able to the psyche” (Schivelbusch 2003: 26). 
István Bibó (1911–1979), the most signifi-
cant Hungarian political thinker, decades before 
Schivelbusch, used the term of political-commu-
nal hysteria for describing post-war traumatic 
collective psychic states. In his description this 
phenomenon has been rooted in 
“[…] protracted conditions of fear that oc-
cur in the wake of major historical shocks of 
communities, such as the demise of political 
authority, revolution, foreign invasion, military 
defeat, and that are manifest in the constant 
dread of conspiracies, revolts, attacks, alliances, 
and the raging persecution of presumed or ac-
tual political enemies. Real community hysteria 
occurs when all its characteristic systems are 
present together: an entire community’s loss 
of touch with reality, an inability to resolve the 
problems life creates, an insecure yet overblown 
self-assessment, and an unrealistic and dispro-
portionate response to the impacts of the outer 
world” (Bibó 2015: 44–45).
The post-war Hungarian political elites 
responding to the trauma of defeat gave up 
the former, pre-war nation building strategy 
based on assimilation: it was replaced by dis-
similation and ethnicity-protection including 
a flirtation with anti-Semitism which had 
been elbowed off from politics by the pre-war 
liberal minded political elites. This paradigm-
shift can be detected in two contemporary 
bestsellers: The Village That Was Swept Away 
(VWS, in Hungarian: Az elsodort falu, origi-
nal edition in 1919) by Szabó (1919) and the 
Three Generations: The History of a Declining 
Age (TG, in Hungarian: Három nemzedék: Egy 
hanyatló kor története, original edition in 1920) 
by Szekfű (1920). 
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d. szabó
Szabó was a writer, ideologue and bête noir of 
the Hungarian interwar thought who exerted 
an enormous influence upon the contemporary 
middle class youth; he was the most important 
forerunner and inspirer of the Hungarian 
Populist Movement (HPM, Borbándi 1976). 
VWS is a strange book: it is not easy to define 
its genre because the belletristic and political 
dimensions have been intermingled in it in 
an inextricable way. Szabó began to write this 
voluminous book in the last years of the Grand 
War: it was a foreboding of the disintegration of 
Historical Greater Hungary (HGH). The writer 
had been influenced by the turn of century right 
wing French radicalism labelled by Charles 
Maurras; he spent a year in Paris as student in 
1900. Albeit he did not know the contemporary 
German cultural criticism his ideas run parallel 
with these of Oswald Spengler. The fact was that 
Szabó, from the respect of the critique of me-
tropolis, was ahead of the German philosopher; 
his book appeared in 1919 while the second 
volume of The Decline of the West (in Germain: 
Der Untergang des Abendlandes, original edi-
tion in 1922 (vol. II)) comprising Spengler’s 
ideas concerning the modern city later, just in 
19222 (to the city-philosophy of Spengler see 
Kovács 2011). 
2 Metropolis-critique, in the theory of Spengler, is 
a part and parcel of his historical morphology of 
civilization. It is not exaggeration to tell about a 
city-metaphysics. Modern metropolis is a typi-
cal phenomenon of ripe civilization; it is a human 
settlement-form dominated by money and intellect: 
“At the beginning, where the Civilization is develo-
ping to full bloom (today), there stands the miracle 
of the Cosmopolis, the great petrifact, a symbol of 
the formless – vast, splendid, spreading in insolen-
ce. It draws within itself the being-streams of the 
now impotent countryside, human masses that are 
wafted as dunes from one to another or flow like 
loose sand into the chinks of the stone. Here mo-
ney and intellect celebrate their greatest and their 
last triumphs. It is the most artificial, the cleverest 
phenomenon manifested in the light-world of hu-
man eyes – uncanny, “too good to be true”, standing 
already almost beyond the possibilities of cosmic 
formation (Spengler 1932: 431).
Szabó, continuing the romantic tradition, 
dressed in the costume of the writer-prophet 
giving a political program of regeneration for 
his nation (Kovács 2007). This intention has 
been accomplished in a mythical framework: 
the plot opposed the eternal village with the 
modern wicked metropolis, Budapest. Szabó 
had been inspired, similarly to Spengler, by the 
contemporary vitalism; his main categories are 
life, volition and action growing out from this 
tradition. He, presumably, had been influenced 
also by psychoanalysis; the human psychē in 
his description much more than the thinking 
Ego of Cartesianism. Rationality is only a float-
ing island in the ocean of human instinct; he 
shared the logophobia of Spengler. Modern city 
is the birthplace of sterile rationality, money-
grubbing and shallow life. Szabó, again similarly 
to Spengler, explained a very strong critique 
about modern representative democracy; for 
him it is a plutocracy covered with the fig leaf 
of sham-democracy.3 The press-manipulated 
citizen is unable to tell apart truth and lie; 
Szabó, interestingly, used the same term for the 
deceived voters as Spengler did: it is a multitude 
of vote-cattle (voksbarom)4 led by nose by the 
3 Spengler in his democracy-critique argues in a simi-
lar way; it is not by chance because modern repre-
sentative democracy was one of the main targets of 
the contemporary cultural criticism. Democracy, for 
the thinkers of this way of thinking, is a concealed 
plutocracy which, according to Spengler, inevitable 
ends in Caesarism: “The mighty ones of the future 
may possess the earth as their private property – for 
the great political form of the Culture is irremedia-
bly in ruin – but it matters not, for, formless and 
limitless as their power may be, it has a task. And 
this task is the unwearying care for this world as it 
is, which is the very opposite of the interestedness 
of the money-power age, and demands high honour 
and conscientiousness. But for this very reason the-
re now sets in the final battle between Democracy 
and Caesarism, between the leading forces of dicta-
torial money-economics and the purely-political 
will-to-order of the Caesars” (Spengler 1932: 465). 
4 Szabó in his Roman describes an electioneering 
meeting in the era of the AHM in a very satirical 
way. The assembly takes place in cold wintertime in 
a barn where the floor has been covered by straw 
so that, “lest be frozen down the vote-cattle’s hoo-
ves” (Szabó 1919: 250). However “electoral comedy” 
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manipulative journalism bought by plutocratic 
capitalism.5 Szabó explained, again similarly to 
his German colleague, a vitalistic race theory 
which was different from biological race theory 
embraced later by Nazism. His theory was a 
strange mixture of Marxist exploitation theory 
and a vitalistic racism. Race, for him, is a psy-
chic unit based on different factors. Blood, i.e. 
ethnicity is very important among them, but 
it is complemented by common culture and 
language. Szabó does not exclude the possibility 
of joining the Hungarian national community 
from outside, by the way of assimilation but 
strategic positions must be possessed by the 
“true-born”, “ethnically pure” Hungarians. 
Assimilation must go at a slow pace; it must be 
a gradual process giving time enough for the 
host society to incorporate the assimilationists 
keeping its national identity.  
Among the races he wrote, following 
the conception of the contemporary social 
Darwinism there is a struggle for life but there 
is no biologically determined value-hierarchy; 
the outcome of historical competition depends 
on outer accidental circumstances. From this 
conception came his cultural anti-Semitism; 
he described Jews as a wonderful race with 
enormous talents; their harmful social role is an 
unintended outcome of the special Hungarian 
conditions; here had emerged a dual society 
comprising of premodern and modern seg-
ments. Jewry had occupied the empty niche of 
the capitalist class because the representatives 
became a distinct literary genre in the region where 
competitive representative democracy realized in a 
distorted oligarchic form.     
5 Spengler’s argumentation is essentially same as Sza-
bó’s: “What is truth? For the multitude that, which 
it continually reads and hears. A forlorn little drop 
may settle somewhere and collect grounds on which 
to determine “the truth” – but what it obtains is just 
its truth. The other, the public truth of the moment 
which alone matters for effects and successes in the 
fact-world is today a product of the Press. What the 
Press wills, is true […]. Its bases are irrefutable for 
just so long as money is available to maintain them 
intact” (Spengler 1932: 461–462).
of Hungarian traditional, feudal society were 
unable to play this role vital important in 
modern world. Hungarian society was simply 
unprepared for competitive capitalism which, 
Szabó argues, was a natural environment for 
the Jewry which felt itself in it as a fish in water. 
Szabó’s conclusion comes from these premises: 
it must be a national revolution emancipat-
ing Hungarian peasantry and ensuring to the 
representatives of this class the key positions of 
economic, social and cultural life. The struggle 
of the eternal village and the vicious capitalistic 
metropolis, Budapest must be ended with a new 
settlement of Magyars repeating the old histori-
cal settlement of Hungarian tribes in the 10th 
century. At the same time Szabó did not give 
a clear know-how or precise schedule of this 
revolution; he was unable to outline a practi-
cal political program. His conception has been 
explained by suggestive metaphors in an expres-
sive language; he remained a prophet scourging 
the sins of the decadent metropolis which must 
be occupied by the Hungarian peasant, the 
most healthy and robust social class, the true 
representative and reservoir of Hungarian race.
g. szekfű
Szekfű published his TG after the WWI. The 
moment of publication in this case was very 
important: 1920 was the year of the TT which 
had sanctioned the disintegration of the HGH. 
Hungarian circumstances were similar to the 
German ones: the societies, in both countries, 
had been shocked by the war defeat and the 
collapse of the old country. 
Szekfű, in TG supplied the wished myths for 
the susceptible audience: scapegoating and self-
chastisement had been given in optimal doses 
by him. The book used the narrative of national 
characterology and questioned the pre-war as-
similative nation building strategy based on 
the liberal nationalism applied by the old noble 
origin political elites. His book, in contrast to 
the work of Szabó, VWS did not propagate the 
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idea of a dissimilative nation building strategy 
based on the concept of ethnical purity; the 
warranty of national regeneration, according 
to Szekfű, is a return to the political romanti-
cism of István Széchenyi (Szekfű 1920: 9–60); it 
is the only authentic Hungarian politics based 
on the idea of organic development compatible 
with Hungarian national character (Trencsényi 
2012). Political romanticism, in the interpre-
tation of Szekfű, is a political opponent of 
national liberalism fostering the national vices 
and national illusions; political romanticism 
does not flatter national vanity, and as such it 
necessarily remains in minority. Liberalism 
focuses upon the revolutionary transformation 
of political institutions, political romanticism, 
as a counter tradition, focuses upon the educa-
tion of Hungarian character; it aims at getting 
rid of national vices and bringing national 
virtues to the surface. Political romanticism, 
in short, is some kind of conservative reform 
activity in consonance with the idea of organic 
development.      
 TG became a bestseller; its author precisely 
felt the public mood of the country. There was 
an atmosphere of scapegoating: the question 
concerning the causes of the catastrophe was 
necessarily intertwined with the question of 
responsibility. It was the liberalism who Szekfű 
put to the prisoner’s dock. Szekfű, similarly to 
the intellectual strategy applied by the think-
ers of the contemporary German conservative 
revolution, including Spengler, described the 
Hungarian history of the 19th century as a 
history of decline (Verfallsgesichte). The title 
of the book unanimously refers to it: it tells 
the story of the successive three generations of 
19th century Hungarian political elites. Every 
generation represents a weaker quality compar-
ing it to its predecessor concerning the sense 
of reality and problem-solving ability. The first 
generation overpasses the level of its successors 
but the dichotomy of political romanticism and 
liberalism appears in the opposing characters of 
Széchenyi and Lajos Kossuth.
Liberalism, in the interpretation of Szekfű, 
was an imported political ideology incompatible 
with Hungarian conditions. Szekfű uses a meta-
phor: the seeds of liberalism had been carried 
by winds onto Hungarian soil. The plant grown 
from them is alien from the Hungarian political 
flora, i.e. it is incompatible with the Hungarian 
national character (Szekfű 1920: 87). This idea 
appears again and again in the book in the form 
of metaphors; the liberal political arrangement 
is compared to a new suit following English 
dress patterns and made to ready by the scis-
sors of a French tailor. The message is clear: 
Western style modernization is inadequate 
among Hungarian circumstances. It became a 
widely shared idea among the thinkers of this 
region in the interwar period. The rejection 
of the copying of the Western modernization 
models has frequently been associated with 
third road theories.
Liberalism, in Hungary was not a rational 
system of political ideas but, as a consequence 
of Hungarian national character, a diffuse senti-
ment or emotion forming the public mood of 
the Hungarian political elites. Szekfű evaluated 
the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 
(AHC 1867) in a very ambivalent manner.6 
The compromise itself, according to him, was 
a sober real politics keeping up the territorial 
integrity of the HGH; the liberal politics of as-
similation, at the same time, Szekfű argues, was 
doomed to failure because it produced a shallow 
assimilation not being more than a language 
change and the Magyarization of names.
Szekfű’s anti-urbanism was a consequence 
of his conception on Jewish assimilation; he, 
6 This question was in the centre of debates of Hun-
garian historiography and political thought. Its de-
fenders evaluated it as a good compromise laying 
down the grounds for economic boom and rapid 
capitalistic modernization of the pre-war decades. 
Its opponents, among them the HPM following Sz-
abó, held it a fatal political act binding Hungary to 
the Habsburg Monarchy doomed to death. In their 
interpretation 1867 was a prelude of the later dis-
integration of HGH after the WWI. Szekfű in this 
debate stood in a middle way position: he evaluated 
highly the AHC 1867 but damned the Hungarian 
political elites because they failed to take advantages 
of it. The scapegoat for him was not the compro-
mise itself but the liberal politics of these elites.         
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following the accustomed platitudes of the jour-
nalism of the second half of the 19th century, 
blamed the official liberal immigration politics 
because of not restricting the Jewish immigra-
tion from Galicia.7 Newly assimilated Jews, 
Szekfű asserts, proved very diligent students 
in over-fulfilment of the requirements of as-
similation. They incited the Hungarian illusions 
on the mirage of Imperium Hungaricum, and 
tried to be more Magyars than the “true-born” 
Magyars and were flattering the Hungarian 
national vanity; in the press they propagated 
the fatal official imperialist politics resulting 
in the alienation of national minorities from 
the Hungarian state. These immigrants, Szekfű 
argued, had occupied the key positions of 
the economy and culture. A whole chapter 
of his book deals with the role of Jewry in 
the culture and the press of Budapest (Szekfű 
1920: 287–300). Jewry, according to Szekfű, 
dominated the main strategic positions of the 
emergent capitalism including both material 
and intellectual production. He saw the situ-
ation disquieting in cultural sphere, especially 
in the press. This press, according to Szekfű, 
had enormously contributed to the making of 
the Jewish metropolitan culture of Budapest 
which was very similar to the Central European 
metropolitan cultures of Wien and Berlin. The 
Jewish-dominated Budapest press launched a 
strange kind of inverse assimilation; the “true-
born” Hungarians, the majority had been as-
similated to the cultural patterns of minority, 
the shallowly assimilated cosmopolitan Jewish 
minority. This is not the fault of the Jews, Szekfű 
concludes, it is the consequence of the weak, 
fragmentized state of the “original” countryside 
Hungarian culture.
7 This motif had been popularized by a book publis-
hed in 1901 entitled On Khazarland (in Hunga-
rian: Kazárföldön). It was a travelling-report whose 
author, Bartha Miklós took a round tour in Galicia 
and depicted the immigrant Jewry in a very negative 
way and called the attention to question of assimi-
lation. The Galician Jewry appeared as the prototy-
pe of the threatening alien. The book prefigured the 
patterns of the dissimilative nation building strategy 
in the interwar period.            
The approach of Szekfű was typical that of 
the contemporary cultural anti-Semitism which 
did not made the distinction between two 
things. There was, on the one hand, a sociologi-
cal fact, the overrepresentation of Jewish-origin 
persons in economy and culture and there was, 
on the other hand, the phantom of organized 
Jewish power. The most known example of this 
phantom appeared in the pages of The Protocols 
of the Elders of Zion (in Russian: Протоколы 
сионских мудрецов, original edition in 1903) 
which was telling about the world-vide con-
spiracy of the power-hunger Jews. Szekfű was 
far away from this theory but his conception 
on the collectively exerted Jewish influence 
cannot be justified as well. The results of his-
torical research has proved that the influence 
of Jewish religious organizations for Jewish 
communities definitely felt in the second half of 
the 19th century in the modernizing Hungary; 
they failed to be main orientation-points in the 
identity construction of Jewish origin persons, 
especially in Budapest.
F. erdei
Erdei (1910–1971) belonged to the younger 
generation entering public life in the thirties. 
He was one of them who established Hungarian 
sociology as an autonomous discipline. In the 
centre of his theory were the conception of 
dual society and a utopia of modernization. He 
elaborated a third-road theory. He was an out-
standing representative of the young Hungarian 
sociographers who aimed at presenting an 
overall picture on the conditions of Hungarian 
peasantry, the majority of the total population 
having stuck half way through between the 
pre-modern feudal, estate-based society and 
the modern bourgeois one (Némedi 1985). 
Albeit in Hungary there was a land-reform it 
did not put an end to the domination of large 
estate with its political, social and cultural 
consequences. The sociographers established 
the populist movement whose main intent was 
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an emancipation performed by the help of an 
overall social and political reform generating 
a grass-root, peasantry-based modernization; 
this conception involved the idea of third 
road comparing  to the Western and Eastern 
European models, including Anglo-Saxon type 
capitalism, national socialism and bolshevism 
as well (Erdei 1973: 123).
The Scandinavian trajectory of moderniza-
tion, not only for Erdei but for the Hungarian 
populism in general, seems to be an attractive 
model of modernization because, in their 
opinion, Scandinavian peasantry was a lead-
ing social factor in a smooth, gradual organic 
transformation of archaic social structures 
into modern ones and proved to be able to 
transmit its cultural values to the whole society. 
Peasantry, in Hungary, has been trapped in the 
structures of dual society, as a sub-society sub-
dued to upper society consisting of the “true-
born” Hungarian gentry and the foreign origin, 
German and Jewish, bourgeoisie.
The dream of Erdei is an autochthone 
Hungarian modernization; its agent is the 
entrepreneur-peasantry of the South Hungarian 
region with its specific settlement-form, the 
market or peasant town which was neither a 
city nor village; it acquired self-government and 
its inhabitants were dealing with agricultural 
market production; they became entrepreneur-
peasants. This kind of settlement, for Erdei, was 
a potential model for a third road urbanization 
involving a modernization compatible with 
Hungarian historical traditions and national 
character. Market town, Erdei emphasized, 
was able to realize a mutually advantageous 
symbiotic connection with its countryside: 
there was no a hierarchical relation between 
them; countryside had not been enforced into 
a subdued position.
The main advantage of the third road 
Hungarian urbanization, Erdei argues, would 
be the avoiding of the exploitation of the coun-
tryside; the peasantry will not be enforced into 
the position of second-rate citizens comparing 
with the city-dwellers. He emphasizes that 
his conception is based on the really existing 
double-dwelling system of the South Hungarian 
market town regions (Erdei 1939: 9) where the 
peasant-entrepreneurs possess farmsteads next 
to the town and commuted between the town 
and the farmstead. This was the separation of 
the place of the consumption and that of pro-
duction; the scene of the former was the house 
in the town that of the latter was the farmstead.8 
What is in mind of Erdei is not only enbour-
geoisiment, i.e. the transformation of the archaic 
way of production into a profit orientated one 
involving a new way of life determined by the 
calculative thinking of the modern capitalist 
entrepreneur. In the centre of Erdei’s theory is 
the political emancipation of the peasantry: the 
town-dwelling peasants are citoyens and bour-
geois at the same time and are able to participate 
in the public affairs of the town. The market 
town model, in Erdei utopian conception, is a 
kernel of a new kind democracy not emulating 
foreign models having proved inappropriate 
among Hungarian conditions because of the 
existence of dual society.
Erdei’s theory has been embedded in the 
dissimilation narrative of the interwar rea. 
His conception is flavoured by a soft version 
of ethnicism associated with an approach of 
national characterology. Hungarian urban de-
velopment, according to Erdei, in the case of the 
majority of Hungarian towns followed foreign, 
first of all German models. Anti-urbanism is 
absent from his conception, albeit Budapest, in 
his opinion, is a pathologically overdeveloped 
megapolis; he esteems the urban way of life is 
univocally superior comparing it to the way of 
life in countryside because of the material and 
8 The critics rightly points out that Erdei exaggerated 
the importance and the extension of South Hun-
garian market town system: he idealized this kind 
of settlement which in the interwar period already 
was in the state of decomposition. However, Erdei 
himself, in the subsequent years of his intellectual 
carrier gave up his utopian third road theory and 
joined the communists accepting their Marxian-
Leninist conception of modernization.    
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cultural goods of civilization offered to the city 
dwellers. Budapest embodies for him a model 
of urbanization which is not compatible with 
the Hungarian national character, consequently 
does not meet the demands of authentic, or-
ganic historical development. The theory of 
Erdei, as it frequently happens in the national 
characterology narrative, produces ambiva-
lences: on the one hand, it presupposes eternal, 
ahistorical national traits remaining unchanged 
behind the veil of temporal, historic changes, 
and, on the other hand, it asserts that these 
character traits are evolving and modifying in 
the historical process. It is not clear, that these 
traits are a priori modalities defining an eternal 
national essence or they are mere potentialities 
realizing in historical time.
The theory of Erdei is a utopia of an alterna-
tive modernization in which the dichotomy of 
individualization, a necessary concomitant of 
modernization and the premodern sociability of 
peasant communities disappears. In the model 
of market or peasant town he sees a possibil-
ity of accommodation of competitive market 
capitalism with a community centred urban life. 
He labels this conception a general urbanism 
intending to eliminate the opposition of city and 
countryside, so characteristic of modern times 
when giant-cities monopolize the advantages 
of civilized urban life at the detriment of the 
countryside.
conclusions
Anti-urbanism assumes different forms in dif-
ferent regions: it is an intellectual – cultural 
reaction to the concrete processes of urbaniza-
tion. However, anti-urbanism appeared spo-
radically everywhere as a continuous tradition 
it emerged at two remote corners of the world: 
in the United States and Germany.9 Hungarian 
9 The history of North American anti-urbanism has 
been treated by Morton White and Lucia White 
(1962). 
anti-urbanism of the interwar period frequently 
followed the patterns of the contemporary 
German cultural criticism: both countries 
were situated in the Central European region 
and running different ways of urbanization 
comparing to the Western European develop-
mental trajectories. So, because of similarity of 
social and political constellations, Hungarians 
cultural criticism, similarly to this kind of 
thought in the other countries of this region, 
was very receptive to the patterns of interwar 
German cultural criticism.10 The main lesson 
of the paper that that these patterns which in 
the German cultural context had been rooted 
in a rich and ramifying philosophical tradi-
tion in Hungarian culture constituted a special 
border-zone in which theoretical-philosophical 
trains of thought became enclaves in literary 
texts including novel, political pamphlet, and 
essay. However, essay became a very peculiar 
product of the Hungarian interwar thought. 
The above-treated novel of Szabó contained a 
series of short essayistic train thoughts treat-
ing the problems of political philosophy and 
political anthropology. The historiographical es-
say of Szekfű applied the motifs of the German 
cultural criticism rooted in the contemporary 
German crisis-philosophy. Erdei, one of the 
grounding fathers of Hungarian sociology, in 
his sociological essays treated the problems of 
cultural and historical philosophy. Essay, in the 
interwar Hungarian culture, was a genre amal-
gamating literature with philosophy, sociology 
and historiography. It was not by chance that 
László Németh, the writer and essayist defined 
the essay as a genre of national education giv-
ing possibility for the author to inseminate his/
her ideas into the national culture. Essay, in the 
interwar Hungarian thought, became the ter-
rain of the approaches of political, cultural and 
historical philosophy.           
10  The question of this receptiveness has detailed been 
explained by Balázs Trencsényi in his book The Po-
litics of “National Character”: A Study in Interwar 
East European Thought (2012). 
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nuo PrasiKaltusio miesto linK alternatyviosios  
urbanizaciJos ir alternatyviosios modernybĖs  
idĖJŲ: anti-urbanizmas KaiP miesto FilosoFiJos ir  
KultŪros KritiKos Paribio zona tarPuKario  
vengrŲ PolitinĖJe mintyJe
gábor KovÁcs
Nuo modernybės iškilimo antiurbanizmo fenomeną lydėjo modernizacijos procesas. Miestas, modernusis me-
tropolis atliko svarbų vaidmenį pereinant nuo ikimoderniojo pasaulio prie modernosios epochos. Archajinių 
struktūrų metamorfozė, įskaitant ekonomikos, visuomenės ir mąstymo sritis, neišvengiamai buvo siejamos su 
tendencijomis, sukeliamomis antipatijos miestui. Antiurbanizmas, kaip nenutrūkstama tradicija, atsitiktinai 
rasdavosi visur – jis iškilo dviejose nutolusiose pasaulio pusėse: Jungtinėse Amerikos Valstijose ir Vokietijoje. 
Motyvas vengrų tarpukario laikotarpio antiurbanizmui buvo „Istorinės didžiosios Vengrijos“ skilimo sukeltas 
sukrėtimas. Prasikaltusio miesto motyvas atsirado atpirkimo atmosferos sąlygomis: Budapeštas atrodė esą 
prieštaraująs vengrų nacionaliniam charakteriui. Šie miesto vaidmens permąstymai įsitvirtino ypatingame 
kontekste, kuriame dera miesto filosofija, kultūros kritika, vokiečių krizės filosofija, politinė filosofija ir 
nacionalinė charakteriologija. Šiuo atžvilgiu tai – savitas Vidurio Europos regiono junginys: vengrų tarpukario 
mintis išplaukia iš regioninių šablonų. 
reikšminiai žodžiai: alternatyvioji modernybė, antiurbanizmas, kultūros kritika, metropolis, nacionalinis 
charakteris.
